Legal Feasibility and Institutional Convergence under UNCLOS: Addressing Contemporary Maritime Security Challenges

Abstract

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains the cornerstone of international maritime law; however, it was negotiated within a geopolitical context that differs significantly from today's interconnected maritime environment. This paper examines the limitations of UNCLOS in addressing contemporary maritime security challenges, including illicit maritime trade, human trafficking, drug smuggling, and piracy, which threaten the security of sea lines of communication and undermine the sustainability of the blue economy. Drawing upon convergence theory and liberal institutionalism, the study argues that growing economic interdependence, shared vulnerabilities, and transnational maritime risks have generated structural incentives for greater regulatory convergence among coastal and trading states. Despite these converging interests, UNCLOS continues to rely on fragmented jurisdictional arrangements and sovereignty-based obligations that constrain effective cooperation and unevenly distribute enforcement responsibilities. From a liberal institutionalist perspective, the Convention lacks adequate institutional mechanisms to facilitate coordination, incentivize collective action, and harmonize enforcement practices across maritime domains. The paper situates UNCLOS within broader debates on legal adaptability and institutional reform in international relations, emphasizing that the effectiveness of international law depends not only on normative legitimacy but also on political and economic alignment among states. It concludes that targeted reforms incorporating liberal institutionalist principles are necessary to strengthen maritime governance, enhance collaborative security efforts, safeguard global sea lanes, and promote the long-term sustainability of the blue economy.