

Reasons for Pak-Afghan Conflict

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the causes of and conflicts along the 2250 KM Durand line that separates two neighboring states. Although both countries are Muslim, their disputes are particularly difficult because Pashtuns, drug trafficking, and the Taliban administration are the two biggest problems in Kabul and Islamabad. Two close Muslim neighbors', Pakistan and Afghanistan, have linguistic ties as well as deep historical, ethnic, cultural, and religious ties. Although Pakistan and Afghanistan share a strategic location and many other things in common, their relationship is marked by mistrust, suspicion, and bitter experiences for both parties. Since the beginning, Pakistan has had to deal with Afghanistan's hostility. All Afghan monarchs, with the exception of the Taliban's four-year rule, expressed varying degrees of hostility towards Pakistan. Conflict over the Duran Line, Pakistan's backing for the Taliban during the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan's involvement in the War on Terror, and the rise of cross-border extremism have all harmed relations between the two nations. This study's primary goal is to assess Pakistan-Afghanistan relations historically and to identify the biggest roadblocks to a harmonious and constructive relationship.

Keywords Afghanistan, Pakistan, Durand line, Peace Process, Ethnicity, Taliban and Drugs Trafficking

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Introduction

An accurate overview covering the various attempts to establish a good border between the populated areas of India and the mountainous regions to the north; in addition, the exchanges from which the Durand line emerged as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; the situation with the ancestral regions in Pakistan and the border regions more generally; and why so many of the obstacles to change appear to be the very factors which prevent change. During the British government's dominion over the subcontinent, two lines were created in an effort to obtain or show limitations or uninhabited areas; these lines were known as the Durand line. (Naqvi, 2015). This line became a source of contention between two governments after the creation of Pakistan. Prior to that, relations between Pashtuns were normal. The Line of Johnson-Ardagh in 1885 reshaped the different areas as Ladakh, Tibet, and Sinkiang, and along with Kashmir was also emerged as a conflict, in 1899 outline about these areas were drawn from McCartney-MacDonald was not a reasonable decision, after that in 1914 McMahon Line repeated criminal mistake and in 1947. Due to Sir Durand's reputation for being a very creditable person and coming from a very illustrious family, Sir Henry Mortimer was given the name Durand. He continued to be an Indian Basic Aid recipient from 1850 until 1924, and his father Henry Marion Durand (1812–1871) had brought the world to Bhopal as an inhabitant for political reasons. (Hussain, 2019) An accurate overview covering the various attempts to establish a good border between the populated areas of India and the mountainous regions to the north; in addition, the exchanges from which the Durand line emerged as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; the situation with the ancestral regions in Pakistan and the border regions more generally; and why so many of the obstacles to change appear to be the very

factors which prevent change. He continued to receive Indian Basic Assistance from 1850 to 1924, while his father, Henry Marion Durand (1812–1871), made Bhopal known to the world as an inhabitant for political reasons. Although intense, the accompanying strain on the bilateral relationship is not unique. A precarious and frequently tense coexistence between Pakistan and Afghanistan has developed over the past seven decades, driven by both internal and external forces. These include the establishment of Pakistan during the division of British India, which Afghanistan refused to acknowledge; a border dispute; allegiances to opposing sides during the Cold War; proxy wars supported by the US and Saudi Arabia; the emergence and sponsorship of the Taliban; and the post-9/11 era, when both nations sided with the US even though Pakistan maintained its ties to the group. Together, these incidents highlight recurring patterns in the two countries' interactions that will affect Afghan and regional stability in the future. They include geopolitical dynamics, security interests, and concerns over sovereignty, cross-border ties, connectivity, and trade. These themes will be even more crucial to establishing future security in Afghanistan and preventing the resurgence of proxy conflict in the region as foreign forces leave the country and the chances for a negotiated resolution decrease.

The Pashtuns:

Pakhtuns were intensely engaged with their land, and Amir and Mortimer's interactions in this region only took place when Pakhtuns were motivated by the prospect of successful outcomes. According to the Greek historian Herodotus, this region was known as Pakhtia, and numerous

streams emanated from there. The phrase "Pakhtunkhwa" has been used to refer to Afghanistanin Pashto since the fifteenth century. The late Prof. A.H. Dani, a renowned historian and researcher from Pakistan, elaborated on this idea and brought it closer to the present day. This terrain is currently located between north-western Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan, and it is mountainous, dry, and sandy by nature. There are high mountains there that reach a height of 7000 feet, as well as lowlands and various meadows. This region is home to a distinct community, and some localities, such as Khyber, Bajour, Mohmand, Orakzai, Kurram, and North and South Waziristan, have their own legislatively coordinated bodies. The six additional regions including the districts of Bannu, Kohat, and Dera Ismail Khan are also included in the FATA. Two nations are connected through different backcountry trade, conflict, lamentation, intermarriage, and union (Ahmad and Youssef, 2018).

There was not a lot done to further the organization's game plan. As the English began to develop the Punjab in 1849, regular attacks by the inclination Pakhtuns on the settled swamp regions, mostly in the latter half of the 19th century, resolved a problem by moving backwoods lower areas struggles to appease inclination families coordinated effort alleviation shockingly retaliatory military movement didn't convey the ideal results. (2008) Yaseen Officer Durand was given responsibility for resolving the Pakhtun belt issue. The Pashtun population was separated into two lands and is depicted on Durand's map of prospective locations according to geographical value. Amir was forced to accept the Durand line since he was powerless at the time (Timsina, 2001).

Durand Agreement:

- I. In November 1893, the Afghan and British governments signed the Durand Line Agreement, which had been amicably negotiated over the community of Pashtuns' distinct perspectives. An analysis of the arrangement's material reveals:
- II. This typically acted as the catalyst for the theoretical framework, which also required the support of the Afghan authority in his own right. However, the Presentation uses the term "associated Governments," and the article 6 notification concludes with the phrase "two Governments," suggesting that the situation has partly stabilised. This agreement was originally prepared in English before being translated into Dari on Afghan demand due to Afghan authority.
- III. The majority of Afghanis sought to guarantee that the original paperwork had to be signed by Afghan authorities.
- IV. Pashtuns from Afghanistan claimed that the 1983 agreement would be re-organized after 100 years, however there is currently no paperwork to support this claim. However, the Pakistani government has fought the claim that it "relentlessly excused Pakistan's reason in 1993 to re-orchestrate the Durand Line with game plans of 1893 arrangement." (Usman, 2018)

Conversion of 'Frontier Line' of 1893 to 'Frontier' in 1919:

Border disputes between Afghan and British officials existed throughout the British rule in India. Backwoods was the cause of the conflict on the Durand line in 1919, which led to a third altercation between the two neighbours. Due to the intensity of the two forces at that time, no favorable

settlement was achieved. Because they sought to preserve their own culture and political stability, the local community in this area pressed the British to grant them full political power over these areas. The local population's rights to this land were not defended by their voices. Glatzer (2007) On the other hand, British authorities sought to progress to lower places through forming relationships with the residents of these areas. British declared the (NWFP) in 1901 for this reason from 1747 until the 1820s, Multan, Mianwali, Bahawalpur, and DGK were all acknowledged as being a part of the NWFP region by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who also gave Afghanis assurances to that effect. NWFP, Punjab, Sindh, and Baluchistan were recognised as one province in 1955 and became West Pakistan. When one unit was still just one unit in 1970, the residents of NWFP rose up and wanted secession from it.

At that point, tension was eased by simply changing the name to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (Malik, 2019) It has been argued that Mortimer Durand isn't just to be remembered as an incredible space gamer who organised the Early English Russian Show by the line to which his name is currently attached (1907). The fact that Kipling has been openly praising the phrase "the Unique Game" is not surprising given that the phrase was originally written to generate quick cash to portray the Fairly English Russian fight authority for CARs. The hardcover edition of the phrase was published soon after the Durand Game plan was approved. (Perez, 2014).The Durand Line, established by English India in 1893 as a result of fighting in Afghanistan, separated the Pashtun communities residing nearby and gave the English control of the area that would eventually become Pakistan's Northwest Backwoods District (NWFP, often known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Throughout the subsequent sixty years, reformist Afghan

governments excused this scenario despite the way that some of Afghanistan's exercises have been organised. (Rizvi, 2019)

Pakistan's Position on the Durand Line:

Pakistan, however, drew support for its position during its ascent in 1947 from the Gondomar Settlement (1879), the Durand Understanding (1893), quite far portrayal notes (1894–1896), the détente (1919), and the ensuing course of action (1921). Its position appears to have grown primarily from the last two mentioned blueprints. The following is how Pakistan defined its demands on the Durand Line: The genuine stance of Pakistan was encapsulated in 1947. It was maintained that the Durand Line is a significant international boundary that was made clear and declared by Afghan experts on small-scale operations (in 1905 and 1919); that the Durand Line ended Afghan influence over the territory or influence over people east of the Durand Line; and that, in the end, Pakistan through a replacement state-guaranteed to the subcontinent chose to exercise overall control over this its property and had all of the benefits and obligations to a replacement government.

Speaking at the Point of Entry on June 30, 1950, Philip Noel-Blend Puncher stated England's position regarding the Durand Line as follows: It is His Significance's Association's opinion that Pakistan is generally speaking law the inheritor of the rights and obligations of the old Committee of India and of His Significance's Association in the Amassed Area in these spaces, and that the Durand Line is the overall frontier. (Ahmad and Khan, 2016). The Pakistani position on the Durand Line was maintained during the SEATO Administrative Meeting, which was convened on 8 March 1956 in Karachi, the capital of Pakistan at the time. According to the claim, party members

made it known that their oversight committees had determined that Pakistan's power released up to the Durand Line, which is a significant distance between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While England advanced a step and declared the Durand Line to be "in general backwoods," SEATO opted to support the Pakistani position. (Tariq, 2018)

Afghanistan's Position on the Durand Line:

When Pakistan became independent in 1947, its border with Afghanistan was not recognised as the Durand line. According to the AIAS-HC study, Afghan reformists refused to accept the border line between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Durand line must be modified when the British leave India. The Pakhtun of this area did not accept the decision made by the English in 1947; they desired to transform their area in accordance with their culture. Indians were experts at creating conflict, and they expressed this conflict for Pakistanis. (Scott, 1980) By population, Pashtuns are the majority in Afghanistan, and they desired to dominate the country in accordance with their educational outlook. Pashtuns did not accept the Amir and British statement of 1893 as the Durand line; as a result, when Pakistan was established, the Afghan government refused to recognise Pakistan as a neighbour and asked Pakistani authorities to redraw the Durand line. A region with such a unified geography, population, and culture cannot tolerate organisational imbalances; yet, to address the problems, both parties must follow a regular procedure. (Tariq, 2020)

Drug Trafficking:

90% of the opium that is grown and exported from Afghanistan comes from other countries, making Afghanistan the largest market for drugs. According to a UNODC report, the value of the illicit heroin and

other drug industries increased by 33% in 2008 as time went on. Opiate handling travel hubs are located all around Afghanistan, and finished sedatives are illegally sold outside of Afghanistan's borders in other countries. UNODC estimates that \$9000–\$16000 annually is channelled to the uprising out of the \$300 million normally created by Afghanistan's opium trade. Afghanistan's areas used for opium poppy developed. (Yousaf, 2021) Additionally, they are the areas with the least trustworthy dynamic radical components. Since then, the US has spent almost \$2.5 billion on operations in Afghanistan to destroy, forbid, adjust equity, disclosed data, and reduce drug requests. These counter-narcotics-related initiatives are funded by the State's Worldwide Opiates impose drugs abstain laws Authorization explanation, the World War Dread additional funding record, and the Protection's Counter-narcotic account. (Qassem, 2008) According to a UNODC report, the value of the illicit heroin and other drug industries increased by 33% in 2008 as time went on. Opiate handling travel hubs are located all around Afghanistan, and finished sedatives are illegally sold outside of Afghanistan's borders in other countries. UNODC estimates that \$9000–\$16000 annually is channelled to the uprising out of the \$300 million normally created by Afghanistan's opium trade. Afghanistan's opium poppy-growing regions expanded. According to a UNODC report, the value of the illicit heroin and other drug industries increased by 33% in 2008 as time went on. Opiate handling travel hubs are located all around Afghanistan, and finished sedatives are illegally sold outside of Afghanistan's borders in other countries. UNODC estimates that \$9000–\$16000 annually is channelled to the uprising out of the \$300 million normally created by Afghanistan's opium trade. Afghanistan's opium poppy-growing regions expanded.

Eradication:

Since 2005, the US has set aside approximately \$992 million for demolition. These initiatives aim to stop the growth of drug-related products by destroying drug-related sampling before ranchers can reap their illegal harvests (destruction) and by rewarding areas that manage to stop the growth of opium poppies. The government has maintained an Afghanistan-focused eradication effort, a chief representative-driven destruction programme, and a driving force initiative known as the Great Entertainers Drive that targets declines in poppy growth. (Bano, 2019)

Table 1: U.S. Funding of Counter-narcotic-Related Activities in Afghanistan

Allotments	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	Total
Elimination	\$258.0	\$134	\$166.7	\$196.4	\$237.0	\$992.2
Interdiction	213.3	102.5	253.2	204.2	193.0	966.3
Rule of law	24.0	26.5	55.5	94.4	182.0	382.5
Public information	8.4	2.0	6.0	2.0	17.0	35.3
Drug demand	0.0	2.7	2.0	2.0	11.0	17.6
Program development and support	12.2	13.2	23.9	21.2	40.2	110.9
Total	\$516.0	\$280.9	\$507.3	\$520.4	\$680.3	2,504.9

- I. The cost of the country's Air Wing armada in Kabul is occasionally included in the data. These aircraft also support other consulate exercises in Afghanistan and counternarcotics initiatives.
- II. During the course of our audit, the State was unable to provide a precise breakdown of the counternarcotic-explicit activities carried out within the law and order/equity change programme region. In keeping with this, this figure includes a few exercises that have no place in anti-drug campaigns.
- III. Funding for Counternarcotic Warning Groups is not included in the statistics because it is included in the end/annihilation category.
- IV. Due to adjustments, numbers may not add up to the totals stated..
(Saikal, 2010)

Justice Reforms:

Since 2005, the financial government has given the Afghan administration around \$3.83 billion to support its efforts to strengthen anti-drug-explicit criminal justice institutions and improve its capacity to apprehend, try, and convict traffickers. Six attorneys from the Division of Equity are supported by the State and serve as trainers, coaches, and advisers to the Afghan Criminal Equity (Team) and the designated judges on the Afghan Focal Opiates Court (Council). These organisations in Kabul have elite public ward ended the undisputed status opiates instances in indictment. (Hussain and Siraj, 2019) Guard also created the State-funded Counternarcotic Equity Center (Equity Center), which serves as a safe office for the Team and Council to carry out their arbitration tasks. A prison facility, a town hall, offices for judges, experts, and examiners, as well as a space for defenders from the Afghan Legal Security Unit to stay, makeup The Equity Place. Additionally, the US Marshals Administration for the Division of

Equity prepares and trains the Afghan Legal Security Unit to provide office assurance at the Equity Community and to resolve the security conundrum that has caused Afghan authorities to carry out large-scale operations in dangerous areas (Mili, 2009).

Overview Coordination of U.S. Agency Involvement:

U.S. counternarcotics training exercises are being conducted in Afghanistan by numerous American groups. The cooperation amongst organisation allies has, in the opinion of U.S. authorities involved in Afghan counternarcotics, been generally successful. In Kabul, a few planning organisations, such as the Destruction Working Gathering and the Counternarcotic Sync Gathering, are used by organisation allies to regularly convene. A variety of tools are also used to facilitate insight and prohibit tasks. The Interagency Activities Coordination Center, which is jointly run by the DEA and the Unified Realm's not kidding Coordinated Wrongdoing Office, facilitates and examines insight data in Kabul to deliver focuses for ban jobs. (Groh, 2020)

The Consolidated Joint Interagency Team Nexus, established by Security in the well-known Afghan city of Kandahar, is intended to provide coordination support, intelligence, and all packages for DEA ban tasks that are limited to ISAF counterinsurgency missions guerillas associated to the drug trade. Opiates Examination Institution is a knowledge network led by the US and the Combined Realm in London that provides crucial operational and investigative support to stop exercises in Afghanistan. (Suleiman, 2013)

Authorities from the Consolidated Combined Interagency Team Nexus and the Interagency Activities Management Institution revealed that

officers are looking into how they interact with other parties regarding narcotics. Additionally, the government recently created and filled a position for an organising chief for advancement and financial issues at the international safe haven Afghanistan who is in charge of all Washington, D.C. assistance platforms, including counternarcotic exercises. In Washington, D.C., the government also hosts meetings of the interagency counternarcotic working group. According to Express, these working-level meetings facilitated the most recent modifications to the U.S. Counternarcotic Methodology. (Majeed, 2019)

Appearing of Taliban:

Focal Asia was employed by Kabul officials during the Benazir administration to redraw the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. After consulting with the majority of the ISI's strongest officers, the prime minister at the moment made a choice. (Hussain and Khilji, 2014)

In the Benazir Bhutto administration, the Afghan agency held a high-level meeting set up by Home Minister Naseer-Ullah Baber. The goal of this meeting was to resolve the border and Pashtun problems with cooperation from Pakistan. Afghans had varying perspectives on this topic and wanted Pakistan to assist them in promoting the Islamist system and resolving ethnic disputes through Gulbadin Hikmat Yar. General Abdul Waheed Kakar, the then-army leader of Pakistan, and General Quli Khan, the head of the ISI, met with the Taliban to discuss the Pashtun issue. (Krasner, 2012) Benazir Bhutto, the prime minister of Pakistan, wished to discuss the Pashtun issue with the focal Asian states. Hidayatullah Khan Niazi supported Naseer ullah Baber in his scheme, which had as its strategic goal the focal Asian states. An agreement was reached at a high level between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and

China to open a high road for transport between Kandhar and Herat.

On October 20, 1994, officials from London, Washington, D.C., Madrid, Paris, Beijing, South Korea, and Islamabad met to discuss partnerships in the areas of rail, road, and telecommunication. Benazir Bhutto travelled to Turkmenistan and Ashkhabad for large-scale projects. These projects included funding between \$300 million and \$800 million for the construction of highway, rail, and other infrastructure. Under the vigorous direction of Herat's legislative leader, Ismail Khan, this task was completed. He pledged to help Pakistan with these initiatives and assured that he would keep the warlords in Southern Afghanistan under control to the government in Islamabad. (Misra, 1998) A convoy of 30 trucks was despatched to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in October 1994. The route between Kandhar and Herat was a very good choice for joining the states of focal Asia.(Gregg, 2019)

Early Taliban Leadership:

Despite the fact that the Afghan Taliban has remained a potent force, there have been major concerns whenever disagreements and fractures have emerged among the group's senior members. When Mullah Omar's death was confirmed in July 2015 and Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor was chosen to lead the group as their leader in August 2015, the first of these disagreements arose on the subject of the group's direction. Despite having been Mullah Omar's close friend, some Taliban members disagreed with Mansoor's height as the head of the gathering despite the fact that he had been. However, on July 31, 2015, Mansoor was announced as the new leader of the Islamic Emirate in a document titled "Disclosure of the Fundamental Office of the Islamic Emirate." (Asal, 2008) Mullah Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah

Haibatullah Akhonzada were both designated as the meeting's representative chiefs. From the start Mullah Omar's youngster Mullah Yaqoob and his kin Mullah Abdul Manan wouldn't recognize Mansoor's plan, yet later they too broadcasted their steadfastness to Mansoor, who was in this route attested as the second top of the Taliban after Omar. (Akhtar, 2020) Due to his actions, certain influential Taliban commandants, including Mullah Mohammad Rasool Akhund and Abdul Qayum Zakir, who formerly oversaw the Taliban military commission, broke away from the group as a whole. Whatever the situation, in 2016 Zakir complied with Mullah Mansoor and publicly declared his devotion to him as the Taliban leader. (Fricker, 2012)

Conclusion

The leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan showed the severe gaps separating the two nations during a recent summit meant to enhance regional connectivity. According to the president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, "networks and organizations supporting the Taliban are openly celebrating the destruction of the assets and capabilities of the Afghan people and State." These networks and organizations are situated in Pakistan. Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, argued that despite Pakistan's best efforts, an ascendant Taliban could not be persuaded, citing Pakistan's war casualties and the instability it may anticipate from the battle in Afghanistan. These allegations are a repetition of the disagreements that have blighted bilateral ties for the past seven decades and continue in spite of several attempts at engagement. The two governments face a challenging undertaking if they are to repair relations given the history of their competing security, sovereignty, and geopolitical objectives. The likelihood of improving bilateral ties now seems slim, especially given the likelihood of a rise in instability after the

removal of international forces. To the cost of both parties, tensions between the two sides run the risk of closing off the few remaining channels for reaching a negotiated settlement and averting additional hostilities. Despite the improbable circumstances, this time of crisis might also pave the way for a potential thaw. A space might be created to limit and manage the sovereignty- and security-related issues that have, up to now, interfered with bilateral relations. This space could be created by lessons gained on both sides after forty years of fighting, as well as by larger regional shifts and geopolitical forces. The benefits of a more favorable relationship may eventually exceed the hazards associated with such engagement if Afghanistan and Pakistan are able to maximize the productive potential of their common cross-border ties while enhancing economic and connectivity links. The two governments may create the framework for better regional connectivity, economic development, and governance by engaging in bilateral engagement, exploiting cross-border Pashtun linkages, admitting fundamental concerns, and building momentum through CBMs. The United States and other third parties can help this process along, but their influence must necessarily be constrained and, if not carefully controlled, could ultimately backfire. The region's stability and the livelihoods of individuals with connections across the common border can only be improved by closer links between Afghanistan and Pakistan. External difficulties could dash plans for an improved bilateral partnership once more and instead result in ongoing, destabilizing hostility

Implications

The proposals and subsequent discussion of the policy implications for relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are pertinent to authorities in

both Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as to larger audiences involved in the bilateral relationship and US policymakers working to achieve a stable conclusion. Many of these suggestions are based on discussions with people in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The implementation of these suggestions will probably be challenging. Those knowledgeable with the lengthy history of the two countries' relationship might cite instances where efforts of a similar nature have fallen short. Their successful implementation will be based on local conditions and political will. Each suggestion is a potential step in the right direction should the circumstances let it, even though none is a magic bullet or has the power to elevate the relationship to the desired "brotherhood" that Afghan and Pakistani officials routinely highlight. These suggestions might be unworkable until the situation gets better if stability keeps declining. But those dormant links could open up opportunities for future Afghan and regional stability, provided some level of outreach can be maintained even in trying times. The only way for talks to be successful is for participants to create an atmosphere that encourages free communication and to plan ahead for a dispute resolution process. Participants should promise to keep conversations confidential, refrain from leaking information to the public, and try to contain incendiary remarks by individuals in their governments who are hostile to dialogue. Although some stray voltage is unavoidable, both parties should publicly refute those opinions to preserve the opportunity for discourse.

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