

Problematics of Pak-Afghan relationships

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Abstract

My article main goal is to analyse the problematic Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship. Since Pakistan's establishment in 1947, Afghanistan has been armed as a permanent united force for policy, and this has been represented as the main cause of our tense relationship. Although Afghanistan is Pakistan's neighbours, there has always been hostility between the two countries. The main problem is that the administration can recognize Durand line dispute. However, the ethnic group in Afghanistan does not accept the Durand Line as an international border. Nevertheless, Afghanistan uses this border to conduct trade with Pakistan and engage in other activities. Negation and bilateral communication can strengthen relationships. As the deadline for resolving the Taliban Durand Line other objectives approaches in this worrying circumstance, Pakistan and Afghanistan must sit down together in admiration.

Keywords: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Durand, Relations, International border, Bilateral Talk.

Introduction

In August 2021, nearly 20 years later, the Taliban took back control of Afghanistan. There are still a lot of questions regarding how events, trends, and policies will develop under a so-called Taliban. The history of bilateral ties since 1947 can be a source of wisdom for Pakistan in preparing for some inevitable outcomes in Afghanistan under the new Taliban leadership. The 1947 State-to-State History. As an illustration, consider how Pakistan welcomed millions of Afghan refugees at various times, including the flood of people fleeing the so-called "civil war" from 1992 to 1996 and the exodus during the Taliban administration. In contrast, people-to-people contacts require mutual embracement. This glaring discrepancy has been discussed extensively in the literature over the years, but how can we explain it in light of our current knowledge of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan? Examining the differences between pre-modern times and the emergence of the modern nation state, a phenomena that evolved in the temporal and spatial setting of the colonial powers like Britain, may help explain the sad state-to-state relations. (Tahir,1982).

It is necessary to present a long-term historical framework and compare it to the time of nation-state development. We contend that it is necessary to conduct an intellectual examination of the region's history in order to present a comprehensive picture and make comparisons with the modern age. The chapter first briefly examines the intellectual history of the area before discussing the three different stages of state-to-state relations. First, from 1947 until 1978, when Afghanistan's claims of irredentism forced it to forsake its policy of a "non-leftist coup d'état in 1978." Then, from 1979 to 2001, when state-to-proxy contacts took precedence in place of state-to-state relations. Although Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a member of the Mujahideen, was eager to lead the new Afghan government, it did not materialize as planned. . In 1994, Pakistan cultivated ties with the Taliban, who seized control of Kabul in 1996 but were unable to exert overall rule. State-to-state contacts between Islamabad and Kabul were restored in the third phase, which spans from 2001 to the present, but Pakistan continues to assist the Taliban and other proxy groups. (Tahir, 1982). Since 2001, a "double game" has been increasingly popular. The Taliban do not appear to be slowing down even after a chance for peace with the Afghan government. By taking a quick look at these phases, we make three main arguments. First, the tension between states is a result of the post-colonial experience and historical linkages that have penetrated residents' lives for a long time. Second, the experiences of the ruling classes in both countries have been markedly different.

This second point is at the core of a discrepancy between the desire of successive Afghan governments to address issues with Pakistan as bilateral ones and Pakistan's ongoing treatment of disagreements with Afghanistan as an integral part of its regional security strategy, particularly within the context of a zero-sum game with India. (Yousaf, 2018). Third, the Afghanistan-Pakistan relations before 1979 reveal a period when both countries were able to resolve disagreements and to plan initiatives entailing a potential normalization of bilateral relations, despite significant ups and downs, including Afghanistan's irredentism and cross-border armed clashes. President Daoud Khan (in office from 1976 to 1978) and King Zahir Shah (who reigned from 1963 to 1972) both wanted to improve relations with Pakistan, which Islamabad ostensibly reciprocated. Only when socioeconomic factors outweighed geopolitical zero-sum concerns and both sides refrained from using proxies to sabotage one another or achieve "strategic depth" was the path toward such warmth visible. It has been the case ever before Pakistan's establishment, when Afghanistan was at the disputed Durand line, established by the British colonial power, is still in place even though

Afghanistan does not accept it. The relationship between the two nations has remained complex throughout the past few decades and has frequently been marked by political conflict. Although Pakistan's support in the fight against the Soviet occupation was frequently acknowledged, substantial anti-Pakistani feeling has emerged in Afghanistan as a result of what has been viewed as "meddling." Despite having many things in common, disagreements have frequently harmed the two countries' bilateral relationship. At the same time, the Durand Line signified commonality in addition to being a representation of colonial haughtiness and animosity between Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Khan, 2016). The Pashtuns living on both sides of the border felt a sense of shared history and culture, which is why it was so contentious. Given the close ties between the two countries' societies and states, it is odd that in the past, both countries have only discussed this relationship on a government-to-government basis. While many observers in Afghanistan have been concentrating on the involvement of the Pakistani Government and the ISI in Afghanistan, the majority of Pakistani analysts – including state functionaries, journalists, think tanks, and academics – have focused on it. While Pakistan generally ignores the dynamics and complexities in Afghan society, Afghanistan frequently overlooks the fact that the ISI is not the same as Pakistani society (or even politics). This was somewhat in line with the general misconception of Afghanistan that existed in Western governments and among academics, which caused them to mistake Afghanistan's outward displays of statehood and democracy for a functional and legitimate state. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan may also become relevant to this remark to a far smaller extent and under different circumstances than the lower levels of statehood outside of the larger cities, which had had presence of legitimacy. (Muhammad, 2018).

The interests of three parties the Afghan government, the Taliban, and the United States have received the majority of attention in efforts to put an end to the Afghan war. Each of the three is directly involved in the battle and is interested in seeing it through to its successful conclusion. The future stability of Afghanistan and chances for the delayed peace process are unknown prior to the withdrawal of US and foreign forces on August 31, 2021. Pakistan, a fourth player that has played a crucial, if covert, role in the fight from its location on Afghanistan's eastern border, is vital to both. According to reports, former US President Donald Trump asked Pakistan for help in 2018 to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table and praised Pakistan's contribution to "advancing the Afghanistan peace process" when intra-Afghan talks started almost two years later. This outreach draws attention to Pakistan's close relations to the Taliban, whom it has protected and

supported for the majority of the past 20 years. Many senior Taliban leaders continue to be stationed in Pakistan, where they have family, own homes and businesses, and where wounded militants can get medical attention. Both the leaders and the people of Afghanistan, who have suffered greatly at the hands of the Taliban and hold Pakistan accountable for facilitating the current conflict, are aware of this fact. (Kamal 2008). Many Afghans wonder why Pakistan keeps its ties to the organization and has not exerted more pressure on the Taliban to scale back their violence, despite the fact that Pakistan disputes having such clout. In statements made in 2015 in Washington, DC, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani stated, "The problem, ultimately, is not about peace with Taliban. Peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the root of the issue.

Core Conflict

Since Pakistan was established in 1947 as a result of the division of India, there is animosity between Islamabad and Kabul. When it was governed by the British Empire, some tense components were also carried over from wars between Afghanistan and India. The Afghan regimes, including the Taliban, have made claims on Pakistan's Pashtun and Baluchi regions and have never acknowledged the Durand Line as the international border separating the two nations. Cross-border insurgencies today are fueled by the same forces that fueled earlier conflicts, including international Islamists and their havens in Pakistan. The arrangements made in the nineteenth century to defend the border of the British Empire by isolating Afghanistan as a buffer state don't apply to a borderland in the twenty-first century embedded in international conflict networks. (Hamaad, 2014). The United States and other foreign forces should promote a multifaceted dialogue and peace-building process center on the issues in the border region if they want to support the new regime in Afghanistan and stabilize both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In order to convince some actors to take such a process seriously, pressure may also be required, although pressure by alone will not be sufficient.

The strategy should aim to improve the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, resulting in their integration into national politics and administration; acknowledge the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan; grant Afghanistan access to Pakistani ports and transit facilities; and maintain open borders for trade, investment, and cultural exchange between the two nations. As a menace to global peace and security, the continued existence of Taliban paradises in Pakistan was pressed upon Pakistan by the United States, the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, and the United Nations. They must also concur to compel Afghanistan and India to pressure Pakistan into making difficult choices by addressing the causes of Pakistan's instability, including as problems with the border region and Kashmir. (Carol, 2008). The violence spread on both sides of the frontier during the time leading up to President Bush's travel to South Asia in mid-March 2006, especially in the 5,000 square mile region of Waziristan and the South and North Agencies. One million people were compelled to flee the Pakistani city of Miran Shah, which served as North Waziristan's administrative center, as a result of the conflict, which claimed the lives of some 300 Islamic, army, and Pakistani soldiers. Landmines, missiles, assassinations, and skirmishes continue in the neighbouring South Waziristan, which has turned into a miniature version of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and is used by Islamist militants to reclaim lost territory, plan new operations, and gradually impose their will on a remote area.

The Northwest Frontier Province's neighbouring districts are also violent. The arrangements made in the nineteenth century to defend the border of the British Empire by isolating Afghanistan as a buffer state don't apply to a borderland in the twenty-first century embedded in international conflict networks. The eventual collapse of the governing Afghan dynasty Durrani in April 1978, following the toppling of President Daud by communist elements, opened the borders and sparked continued combat relations. (Ahmad, 2017). The first significant step toward the border region conflict being global was the Soviet invasion on Christmas Eve 1979. Pakistan has become a key ally of the United States as a result of the Soviet invasion. The Afghan resistance, which was rooted in the refugee camps along the Durand Line, was largely shaped at the whim of the country's ruling army. Pakistan refused to recognize the parties and exiles affiliated with the previous regime because it wished to prevent the creation of Afghan nationalist militants on its territory. It has directed supplies from Western Europe, China, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and other countries to Islamists who are also liberally supported by wealthy Gulf individual donors. The jihad in neighbouring Afghanistan has been denounced by the government of Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as part of its main objective to "Islamize" Pakistan. The Nationalist Pashtun political parties with seats in the national and provincial legislatures of Pakistan have toned down their aspirations and changed the name of the Pashtun province east of the border Durand to "Pakhtunkhwa." This province will include the NWFP, other Baluchistan districts, and tribal organizations. During the changeover of an ostensibly civilian government from 1988 to 1999, Pakistan's Afghan politics remained under the control of the military. From supporting seminaries to equipping domestic

Islamist groups, Pakistan saw a significant transition. As a means of dealing with India, a nation with more than eight times its population and economic capital, Pakistan has taken part in the multiple battles in and surrounding Afghanistan — the Cold War confrontation, the post-Cold War civil struggle, and the war on terror. According to Pakistanis, the ruling class in India does not completely recognize Pakistan's right to exist. Pakistan's backing of the Taliban and then of Islamist organizations, particularly Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Islamic Party. (Braitdem, 2001).

Land that gives the Pakistani military strategic depth and a safe border. In other words, Pakistan attempted to back a client state in Afghanistan that would provide its forces room to withdraw and regroup in the event of a conflict with India. The British followed this policy, considering Afghanistan to be a component of the security buffer zone for South Asia. In accordance with the Geneva Agreements of February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew on April 14, 1988, and a US-Soviet dialogue attempted to open the way for elections being run by a transitional administration. If the Geneva Agreements had been implemented, Afghanistan would have had a weak government that was nonetheless connected to the Soviet Union but would not have Soviet soldiers stationed there. (Brasher, 1983).

However, the war went on without a strong agreement on the political settlement of the borders, which caused the Afghan state to fall. Since Zia-ul-Quasim's death in an aviation crash in August 1988, when representative rule was reinstated in Pakistan, the USA and Pakistan have been pursuing anti-Soviet measures. The Nationalist Pashtun political parties with seats in the national and provincial legislatures of Pakistan have toned down their aspirations and changed the name of the Pashtun province east of the border Durand to "Pakhtunkhwa." This province will include the NWFP, other Baluchistan districts, and tribal organizations. During the changeover of an ostensibly civilian government from 1988 to 1999, Pakistan's Afghan politics remained under the control of the military. Without a complementing economic growth plan, no reform effort will be successful. The World Bank or another international organization has been asked by the Awami National Party to carry out a thorough baseline assessment to evaluate the economic condition and assist Pakistan and the people of the FATA in developing an all-encompassing plan. The first steps in this manner will be to establish unique opportunity zones along the Durand Line and connect FATA to the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. On the Afghan side, efforts are being made to create those zones. In May 2006, Musharraf proposed that they be created with American assistance. (Karlson, 2008).

Bilateral Trade Profile:

Pakistan and Afghanistan have always had tense relations. Cross-border infiltration, refugees, drug trafficking, activist organizations, counter-terrorism conflicts, and communication with terrorist networks have all contributed to a lack of trust and deteriorated relations. The security market is impacted by such problems, which makes it more difficult to enhance trade and commercial ties. Despite difficulties, Pakistan continues to be Afghanistan's principal trading partner, and Afghanistan is Pakistan's second-largest trading partner. As a result of decreased aid and other foreign exchange inflows, it is projected that combined demand in Kabul will diminish in the upcoming years. As a result, Pakistan must also devise methods to lessen the effects of this downturn on Pakistan's economy. Afghanistan will continue to rely on Pakistan and Iran for its foreign trade because it is a landlocked nation. Afghan players desired to cooperate on a shared economic space that might significantly improve trade between the two nations. For Pakistani investors, Afghanistan offers potentially huge prospects, but those benefits won't materialize unless financial processes are streamlined and personal security and infrastructural development are ensured. Trade increased dramatically between Islamabad and Kabul from \$0.83 billion in FY06 to \$2.1 billion in FY13. The largest percentage, 24.3 percent as of FY13.2 came from Pakistan, although that proportion has decreased since 2011 as a result of a variety of circumstances, including political unrest, delays at customs, the suspension of NATO supplies, and others. Iran's part in transit commerce has steadily climbed while Pakistan's share has decreased. India, Iran, and Afghanistan recently concluded the draught transit agreement, and a land route to the Persian Gulf is planned to depart from Iran's Chabahar Port in the Gulf of Oman. Only 5% of all imports are now documented as coming from Afghanistan, with exports totaling \$363.70 million in FY13.3 32.2% of all Afghan exports go to Pakistan, the country with the highest export volume. (Chapry, 2012). The APTTA was initially hired in 1965 in Kabul and another two nations. The APTTA was revised in 2010 to allow Afghan exports to Pakistan's Wagah border with India as well as to the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar. Additionally, trucks from Pakistan will transport commodities throughout Afghanistan. The agreement also resulted in the formation of a Joint Chamber of Commerce. Extending the APTTA to Tajikistan was the first stage in the development of a North-South trading corridor in July 2012. While the transit agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan would provide trade between Pakistan and Tajikistan, the proposed agreement would permit Tajikistan to export and import goods to Pakistan from the ports of

Gwadar and Karachi. A ministerial delegation from Tajikistan has arrived in Pakistan to look at potential business opportunities across several sectors. Ashraf Ghani, the president of Afghanistan, aimed to strengthen ties with Pakistan's neighbours, especially New Delhi, during his visit to Pakistan in November 2014. By 2017, Ghani set a goal of \$5 billion in bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Cordobez, 1995). In exchange, Pakistan pledged to decrease port and storage duties and fees and remove 95% of Afghan imports made under the Transit Trade Agreement within twenty-four hours. For mutually advantageous trade relations, more agreements between the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan are required.

The following recommendations can provide a way forward for the long journey:

- I. "People-to-people interaction is a prerequisite for the development of lasting economic connections; as a result, the current restrictions on business visas need to be further loosened. There are several solutions that might be investigated and put into practise, including visa-on-arrival, long-term, multiple-entry, and investment-friendly visas for businesspeople and skilled workers.
- II. "The current situation calls for a preferential trade agreement between the two nations that would increase market access for Afghan goods on the Pakistani market and deal with the smuggling problem. To encourage investment in both nations, this agreement should include a detailed plan for regional tariff simplification and the elimination of double taxation.
- III. "Both parties should pledge to assist the transit of Pakistani goods through Afghanistan to Central Asia as well as the transit of Afghan exports through Pakistan to India as part of this agreement.
- IV. "Nontariff measures also need to be improved, particularly at the border crossing locations for customs. By lowering the cost of inspecting and testing shipments and enhancing security, operational and policy-level reforms should be put into place to promote commerce. It is impossible to overstate the value of modern infrastructure for commercial ties, especially the network of highways and railroads. Infrastructure improvements should be given top priority in both nations to lower transportation costs. It is crucial to note that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would play a crucial role in the growth of trade between Central Asian and South Asian nations. "A financial mechanism for trading must be available. It is advised to establish an EXIM bank for trade

settlements in several currencies as well as a formal arrangement for expenditures like freight insurance. (Cogan, 1993).

Settlement through Peace Jirga:

The institution of Jirga is frequently cited as the oldest and most important long-standing Pashtun cultural organization. The Jirga "had both a political and a judicial character" and is clearly seen and treated as an essential and integral component of the Pashtun way of life. This includes additional coordination with regional nations on matters like reducing outside aid to insurgent groups, encouraging greater support for Kabul, and increasing reconciliation efforts. Evidence to support this claim is still lacking.

Until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that Pakistan has taken such steps as arresting senior Taliban and Haqqani officials in Pakistan, the United States could also withhold a sizable portion of reimbursements and support that are authorized for Pakistan under the National Defense Authorization Act. Regarding reconciliation, the United States may take a more active part in negotiations, especially given that China's expanded participation in the process has yielded only modest results. The United States may take into account incorporating Taliban representatives in a future Loya jirga in collaboration with Kabul. (Jackson, 1980). The Pashtunwali tribal code, which serves as both a method of dispute settlement and an independent state-owned code of conduct, is the foundation of the Peace Jirga Afghan-Pak. In the Washington meeting of October 2006, President George W. Bush expressed his support for Presidents Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf, acknowledging their potential in battling the Taliban insurgency and battling international terrorism. At the peace negotiations from both countries were gathered 700 "parliamentary representatives, political parties, religious academics, tribal elders, regional councils, civil society, and the business community." The Jirga Declaration confronts the two countries' own patronage and determination as a foundation for long-term peace in the region. The recommendations also emphasized the link between narcotics and terrorism, and Jirga members agreed to condemn the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of poppies, in addition to other illegal products. Finally, both President Karzai and President Musharraf agreed to collaborate on infrastructure projects in areas reliant on poppy cultivation and trafficking in collaboration with the international community. (Lewic, 1987). The recommendations included critical prioritization of national policies and safety strategies for counter-terrorism initiatives in each country; the

formation of a smaller jirga of 25 members from each country; and the continuation of dialogue and reconciliation with opposition forces. It was also agreed that the two countries' relations would be based on the principles of "mutual respect, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence." Political leaders in Afghanistan have utilized a devoted Jirga or Grand National Assembly to demonstrate national unanimity during the country's recent century-long crises. There have been a total of 18 loyal jirgas since the first one was convoked in 1923 and the first Afghan Constitution was passed. They were established with the first Afghan constitutions. The faithful Jirga system served as the foundation for the reconstruction of democratic institutions following the ouster of the Taliban administration in 2001. An Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) in 2002 recognized the interim agreements made at the 2001 Bonn Conference, and a Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ), which convened in late 2003 and ended in January 2004, ratified the redrafted Afghan constitution. Loya jirgas were formalized in the 2004 constitution, defining their makeup and function. The majority of loya jirga members were supposed to be chosen from district councils, but because they were never elected, it was not possible to hold a loya jirga as required by the constitution. 2013 (Solomon) The failure to hold a loya jirga in accordance with the constitution undermines it more as the legitimacy of Afghanistan's constitutional underpinning is called into question more frequently. In the past two decades, the administrations of Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani have held Loya jirgas on an as-needed basis because they have been unable to do so on the basis of the constitution in order to appear to have national unity at crucial times. However, this strategy creates a paradoxical scenario in which the constitution cannot be amended using constitutional means and no constitutional loya jirgas are held to fill in the gaps. (Lenardo, 2010).

Elimination Drugs Trafficking:

Despite the significant geological distance separating the Taliban and Hezbollah and the unique environments in which they operate, determined strategy has led both group away from philosophical direction and toward the use of drug sales to complement or replace "maturing elective income streams." Hezbollah and the Taliban created intricate international dispersion structures throughout this encounter, expanding their roles far beyond the maintenance of political control and the pursuit of their philosophic goals inside their home countries. Undoubtedly, drug production has always been prevalent in the home regions of both the Taliban and Hezbollah. (Adward, 2011). The last half of the 1970s and the middle of the 1980s saw unchecked weed growth in the Bekaa valley as the Lebanese Civil War disrupted the majority of the country's

financial transactions and the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon created a conduit for the import of hashish from Lebanon into Israel. Hezbollah benefited from a rigorous order, or fatwa, given during the 1980s giving strict validity to the normally dirty and illegal movement of pharmaceutical dealing when it was founded in the mid-1980s, enlisting heavily from prominent Bekaa Valley clans and families. The fatwa, which was purportedly issued by conservative Iranian pioneers, purportedly stated: "We—America and the Jews—make pharmaceuticals for Satan. In the event that we are unable to kill them with guns, we will use medicines to do so." According to a declassified FBI report from November 2008, "Hizbullah's profound chief... has indicated that opiates trafficking is ethically pleasing if the meds are provide to Western rebels as a part of the battle against the opponents of Islam." Enter any event, Hezbollah's need for money drives its actions, and the response to drug peddling continues to be a fatwa and deals to in negotiations. (Embree, 1979). Hassan Nasrallah, the general secretary of Hezbollah, categorically condemns drugs as a scourge, one that he opposed to the point of assisting Raqqa Hariri's government—at least for as long as Hezbollah let Harriri to live. Nasr Allah's dismay over the drug plague hasn't stopped his association from using it to enormous advantage, though. In 2008, U.S. and Colombian professionals worked together on Activity Titan, which found and "destroyed a cocaine-carrying and criminal tax avoidance association that allegedly assisted store Hezbollah activities. .. washing millions of dollars' worth of cocaine every year and giving Hezbollah 12% of the proceeds Chekry Harb, a Lebanese boss living in Colombia who was permitted by Colombian authorities to maintain frequent phone communication with Hezbollah leaders and travel to Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, was one of those apprehended during the trap. (Fernado, 2013). In April 2013, the Depository Office once more accused Hezbollah of trafficking illegal drugs internationally and imposed a boycott on Kasseimi Rmeiti and Co. for Trade and Halawi Trade Co., two Lebanese cash trade companies that had taken over the Lebanese Canadian Bank's recent tax evasion scheme. The Taliban faced an off-kilter task in the same way that Hezbollah did "dealing with the clear distinction between their Islamic faith and the illegal drug trade. But well-known blessing was on their side. The Taliban had taken over control of everything "they incapacitated the population, implemented rule of peace and law, imposed strict Sharia law, opened the streets to traffic, which quickly reduced food prices on the grounds that a depleted, war-exhausted populace thought of them as friends in need and peacemakers. The tolerant population welcomed all measures with open arms.

Taliban permitted the resumption of poppy development; under Taliban rule a little plot creating only 45 grams of opium each year could acquire its proprietor over 1,000 dollars—a fortune in rustic Afghanistan. To accommodate Deobandi confidence and medication creation. The Taliban have granted farmers an Islamic license to produce more opium, despite the Koran forbidding Muslims from producing or consuming intoxicants. The leader of the Taliban's drug-control rivals in Kandahar, Abdul Rashid, laid out the concept for his unique effort. He is authorized to impose a strict ban on the production of hashish because "Afghans and Muslims consume it." Rashid, though, counsels me without a hint of mockery: "Opium is acceptable given that it is burned through [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans." (Giffen, 2009). Practical is surprisingly similar to the strategy used by Hezbollah, which prohibits (read: wishes endlessly) the use of opium and heroin but not their production and exchange. The horrific province of Afghan cases at the time the Taliban seized power, as well as the financial disaster brought on by Talibanization, only magnified the overall value of poppy growth and strengthened the association between the Taliban and heroin production: between 1996 and 1999, the poppy harvest increased from 2,248 to 4,565 metric tons. Mullah Omar now ordered a 33% reduction in the poppy harvest, bringing the harvest down to 3,276 metric tons in 2000, due to international pressure against Afghan drug production as well as the Taliban regime's bad record on ordinary freedoms. Taking this decline into account, the collection actually generated a projected absolute value of US \$900 million, exceeding Afghanistan's \$130 million in legal travel expenses and contributing more than 33% of Afghanistan's \$2.5 billion GDP for that specific year. The leader of the Taliban's drug-control rivals in Kandahar, Abdul Rashid, laid out the concept for his unique effort. He is authorized to impose a strict ban on the production of hashish because "Afghans and Muslims consume it." However, Opium is acceptable because it is being burnt through by Westerners rather than Muslims or Afghans, says Rashid without a hint of sarcasm. (Goodson, 2001).

The pharmaceutical industry is quite opinionated in that it generally includes - and frequently emphasizes - linkages to undermine state components at various levels of government. Progovernment and vigilante state forces, some public authorities or even small segments of the public authority, including a few security-related areas, may be just as deeply, if not more deeply, involved in the illegal drug trade than radicals. . In struggle territories, the medication business plays a multifunctional part by:

- I. "I. facilitating the financial benefit of illicit entrepreneurs, with all associated social and economic ramifications (such as corruption)
- II. The local populace, especially in the outlying, marginalized areas, relies heavily on this source of income to play an adaptive role as a social-economic coping and survival strategy.
- III. "Financing armed actors who also use drug earnings to actively finance the war effort, weaponry and other equipment purchases, etc."
- IV. The illegal drug trade's multifaceted role in conflict zones explains why the link between drugs and violent conflict (combat, psychological warfare, public brutality, etc.) isn't quite as clear-cut as it might first appear. Therefore, it is nonsensical to
- V. Investigate drugs and violence associated with conflict as two independent variables within a closed self-administrative framework.

For instance, equipped conflict could be as a catalyst for the growth of the pharmaceutical industry (as it was the situation during the counter Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in 1979–1989). (Adam, 1996). However, it could also flood in areas with more security, such as those under Taliban rule in the mid-late 1990s. Over time, the U.S. counternarcotic strategy has adjusted its emphasis across programme areas to align with the overall counterinsurgency campaign. The United States' anti-drug strategy for 2005 focused on five programme areas: prohibition, equity reform, public data, disposal/annihilation, and elective jobs. As a result of the connections between dealers and radicals, the U.S. Branch of Guard (Safeguard) policy and rules of commitment were modified going ahead to allow for greater military participation in counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Additionally, the U.S. counternarcotic strategy has changed to more closely align with counterinsurgency efforts by downplaying devastation, focusing on ban initiatives in greater detail, and increasing farming assistance. (Luding, 1995).

The US's use of full-scale poppy cultivation as a crucial component of overall counternarcotic success has limitations in that it doesn't encompass all aspects of U.S. counternarcotic efforts. In recognition of this, the organization is working to promote estimates that more accurately reflect overall counternarcotics success. However, GAO was unable to fully assess the extent of progress due to the lack of execution measures and interval execution focuses to quantify Afghan limit, which are best practices for execution across the board. U.S. offices have demonstrated progress within the counternarcotics programme territories. As an illustration, even

though Protection is training Afghan pilots to fly interdiction missions on their own, this programme need break execution focuses to assess gradual advancement. For instance, helplessness security, particularly in areas where a rebellion is in power, has forced destruction and public data endeavors. Additionally, certain challenges have an impact on specific programme zones. For instance, the Afghan Public Police are notorious for their drug abuse and compulsion. The board of a successful programme depends heavily on observation and assessment. Checking is essential to ensuring that programmers are carried out as planned, and frequent evaluation aids programme administrators in decision-making, adequacy improvement, and the illumination of options for present and future programming. Through direct U.S. organization monitoring, project worker disclosure, and outsider check, U.S. organizations in all counternarcotics regions have monitored programme progress. (Lone, 3013). For instance, U.S. Division of (State) officials and contractors frequently disclosed destruction data, which the Joint Countries Office of Medicines and Wrongdoing reviewed. Additionally, U.S. agencies oversaw and recorded programme evaluations to increase viability. We are recommending the four measures below to enhance the U.S. government's ability to track counternarcotics goals.

- I. "The Secretary of Defense creates performance goals to gauge the progress being made in training the CNPA.
- II. "To evaluate Afghanistan's capacity to independently carry out public information activities, the Secretary of State adopts performance indicators and interim targets."
- III. "The Secretary of State shall establish clear definitions for low-, mid-, and high-level traffickers in consultation with the Administrator of the DEA and the Attorney General to enhance the ability of the U.S. and Afghan governments to track the level of drug traffickers arrested and convicted."

Settlement with Taliban:

According to all accounts, Pakistan is about to experience a time similar to what Afghanistan went through between the fall of Dr. Najibullah and the arrival of the Taliban in the 1990s, when numerous mujahideen organizations fought to annihilate their rivals. The likelihood of other Islamist local armies being drawn into a shared fight amongst radical gatherings is growing as the Pakistani Taliban expand their jihad to match Islamist gatherings. In the unlikely event that this happens, it will be bloodier than the mujahideen battles in Afghanistan in the 1990s and have a

tremendous global impact. On September 27, 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul without much resistance. Dr. Najeeb Ullah, the former president of Afghanistan, and his siblings were killed there and then after being granted sanctuary at the UN Base camp in Kabul for more than four years. Six people were chosen by Mullah Muhammad Omar, Amir Ul Momineen, to run Shura. The organization of Kabul was given to Mullah Muhammad Rabbani, who was also given the titles of Pastor of Police and Boundary Zones, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Clergyman of Protection, Mullah Abdul Razzaq, Clergyman of Instruction, Mullah Syed Ghias Ud Clamor, Priest of International Concerns, and Mullah Muhammad Ghaus, Priest of Safety. In its initial communications, the Taliban group declared that implementing Islamic Laws, including women's rights, was a crucial government policy. (Morgenthue, 1963). They continued to adhere to Islamic Laws and Rules with a progressive soul, Ignoring International Analysis and Dissension. They may have done without consideration of the restrictions and impediments imposed on women by the Taliban's Islamic Laws. Many Afghans who had been uprooted by the Soviet onslaught and the ensuing war migrated to Pakistan. As the years passed, a significant increase in the number of madrassas dominated by the JUI was observed in Pakistan. The initial Taliban sprang from these Deobandi groups. The Taliban "get on track to institute an important plan: reestablish unity, incapacitate the populace, implement Shri 'a... and protect Islam in Afghanistan," according to Ahmed Rashid, who defines this period as one that "implanted extremist beliefs in responsive impoverishment plagued youth." Al-Momineen Amir Mullah Umer stated that the public authority's top priority should be the organization of viable equity. Amir Ul Momineen highlighted the importance of strong measures for providing prompt equity to people, resolving their complaints, and providing them with treatment at the earliest opportunity while examining the report about the organization of Equity, presented by Mullah Abdul Ghafoor Sanaee, the Main Equity. Many Afghans who had been uprooted by the Soviet onslaught and the ensuing war migrated to Pakistan. (Suhail, 2015). As the years passed, a significant increase in the number of madrassas dominated by the JUI was observed in Pakistan. The initial Taliban sprang from these Deobandi groups. According to Ahmed Rashid, this period was marked by the implantation of "extreme notions in receptive destitute youths," which later arose as the Taliban "become on track to enact a vital plan.

From the middle of the 1990s onward, the generally strict educational initiatives of many madrassas constricted into an educational strategy specifically created for producing jihadists who

were willing to submit to aggression and who were philosophically driven. Ahmed Rashid observes that a significant number of initiates (including English-speaking Pakistanis) underwent only a few brief periods of philosophical Deobandi indoctrination before "being dispatched off the bleeding edge by Taliban initiates, who frequently came up with ISI officers." Thus, these volunteers fought in Afghanistan or Kashmir under Indian management against the Northern Partnership and the United States Afghanistan's post-Soviet era is marked by a number of forces, NATO-ISAF goals, interdependence, and Pakistani military developments. (Asad, 2017). Future PNT administrators were exposed to non-Afghan jihadists, specifically those rehearsing a brutal and globally structured brand of Islamism, during the earlier of these two periods, when Pakistani attackers battled and rose through the Taliban positions prior to their expulsion in 2001. As a result, a large portion of the philosophy taught in Afghanistan was more political (and global) than it had been in Pakistan's madrassas under Deobandi control. It is sometimes argued that this convergence of political impulses and outdated Deobandi standards resulted from the Pakistani soldiers' philosophical "growing," which gave them a far wider perspective than their more recent, parochial madrassa counterparts. Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulavi Nazir both fought in the Soviet-Afghan Conflict during this time, which was specifically the neo-fundamentalist global jihad radicalization given by al-Qaida. Pioneers like Nek Mohammad fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern Coalition. . Born in 1981, Hakimullah Mehsud isn't believed to have fought in Afghanistan before 2002; instead, he gained his tactical knowledge through engaging in battle with the Pakistani military and other PNT organizations in the ancestral zones. The Taliban-Afghan government peace talks, which are being mediated by Pakistan, are once again the subject of discussion. The focus of Afghan, Pakistani, and American officials at the "Heart of Asia" Ecclesiastical Meeting in Islamabad on December 9, 2015, was on resuming the conversation that had bogged down in late July following the leak of the news of Mullah Omar's passing. But despite this, and given the current situation, the wisdom of reviving compromise discussions with the Taliban isn't universally acknowledged. (Iftihkar, 2015). A few previous attempts have just resulted in the Taliban being granted legitimacy, allowing them to present themselves as a political force equivalent to the Afghan government while suffering no consequences. However, it doesn't seem like there is another viable choice. Since the middle of the year, developments in the combat zone in Afghanistan have only served to further reinforce the fact that the Taliban and the Afghan security forces are at odds. Impasse, with neither party prepared to expect victory. Whatever the

motivation behind the conversations, it won't be easy to achieve a meaningful discourse. The ability and willingness of Afghan and Pakistani experts to put aside their differences and collaborate is the key requirement. The profound scepticism between the two neighbours was also evident at the Core of Asia gathering in addition to this recognition. (Haqqani, 2005). As evidenced by Afghan president Ashraf Ghani's efforts to appease Pakistan and the country's positive response, Afghanistan and Pakistan have recently discovered some points of agreement. However, the shared practise of finger-pointing since the breakdown of the late spring negotiations with the Taliban advises that they continue to make absurd assumptions for one another on the compromise front. Talks cannot be revived without attending to the critical differences between Afghan and Pakistani perspectives. In any case, three crucial issues need to be addressed right away: whether Pakistan and Afghanistan can agree on a system to deal with those who are opposing the Afghan state and are opposed to talks, how quickly talks will result in a decrease in savagery, and the degree of buy-in from Afghanistan's divided government. Perhaps the primary point of distinction in the debates is Pakistan's typical work. Many Afghans accuse Pakistani officials of being complicit in the brutality committed in their country by the Taliban and Haqqani network because they believe Pakistan is aiding their activities. Pakistan needs to accept responsibility for reducing violence in Afghanistan, stopping support and assistance for terrorist groups, and possibly even engaging in military action against them. (Hussain, 2020). The Taliban must negotiate with the insurgency, but the Kabul government would prefer to speak with a weak Taliban. Even though the world overlooks this behavior, Pakistan claims it is powerless to bring an end to the cruelty in Afghanistan and should only be held accountable for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. While Pakistan pledged to exert pressure on the Taliban throughout the late-spring negotiations and compromise outcomes if the violence in Afghanistan continued and the Taliban refused to participate, the outcomes were unknown, Pakistan would not accept responsibility for the negotiations' failure, and it did not consent to reject the Taliban for it. The West has unable to convince Pakistan to send a substantial enemy force against the Taliban and the Haqqani organization despite prolonged periods of pressuring considerations. While the degrees of Pakistani assistance appear to have come and gone, none of the contributing factors are likely to change in the near future to aid in reviving discussions. In addition, if the current levels of cruelty in Afghanistan continue, discussions cannot be supported for a very long time. Therefore, a middle ground should be found that addresses the levels of brutality in Afghanistan

by Pakistan-based groups while also bringing the Taliban initiative to the table—without anticipating Pakistan to launch a massive operation against them.

In order to determine which groups, explorers, and local officials might be opposed to negotiations or actively working against them, Afghanistan and Pakistan should have ongoing, transparent, and insight-driven interactions. By agreeing to a made-to-order assumption, Pakistan would concentrate on acting clearly by increasing economic pressure, capturing (and maybe handing over detainees to Kabul), or using force against individuals operating in its shadows. A more targeted strategy could prevent Taliban or other psychological militant groups that are the subject of discussions from moving around freely and attacking within Afghanistan. It could also prevent actions that would essentially force them into Afghanistan and pose a much greater threat to the already overburdened Afghan security apparatus. (Bano, 2019). Given that it would merely be acting directly against those Taliban chiefs in opposition to discussions and not taking part in efforts against the Taliban development on the run, Pakistan would likely be more amenable to this task. Pakistan has long been concerned about the possibility of the Taliban betraying the nation. Afghanistan would also concentrate on working firmly against Pakistani Taliban groups known to launch attacks within Pakistan from Afghan territory as payment for Pakistani actions. Getting early wins will be essential to implementing this game strategy. Specific goals and actions would have to be agreed upon quickly by both parties. As much as is conceivable, these victories should be publicized and exploited to rekindle support for the compromise effort. Simple conversation outcomes will be the defining factor in reducing extreme viciousness in Afghanistan. Although a complete defeat by Afghan security forces is improbable, the Taliban are unlikely to stop their violence without payment. Thus, it is crucial to agree on the fundamental conditions of a truce as soon as possible. Multiple rounds of discussion might be an extravagance that this interaction is currently unable to handle, especially in light of the ongoing discussions about Taliban power. Experts from Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be assured that the Taliban representatives at the table can effectively control the fighting in Afghanistan unless their commitment to a ceasefire is put to the test. Additionally, it appears that Ghani is under pressure after returning to Pakistan as a professional. For the compromise discussions to move forward, Afghan and Pakistani experts should agree to brief, usually definite timelines that, to the greatest extent possible, should be set well before the start of the Afghan fighting season in 2016. The topic of a truce should be specifically addressed in the next round of discussion. Pakistan should put

pressure on the Taliban to cooperate by making reasonable demands and assumptions. The Afghan experts should maintain a comparable level of common sense. Pakistan should concentrate on maintaining the pressure on the Taliban as the discussions advance so that the group bargains openly and acknowledges its contributions. (Braitwait, 2011).

Pakistan and Taliban:

There are many signs of economic, social, and societal rebirth in Afghanistan when compared to Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. Today, more than 8 million Afghan children, including over 2 million girls, attend schools across the country, and the country's economy is still worth \$20 billion, up from \$2 billion in 2001. Afghanistan, in particular, has effectively held two parliamentary and governmental decisions and is preparing for a third in 2014 and 2015. Afghanistan still faces a test, though, and that test is the Taliban. Although it appreciates Pakistan's assistance, the Islamist dominance poses a real threat to Pakistani and Afghani nationalists. 12 years into the US-led war against the Taliban, military success has been shaky mostly due to the US's shifting priorities toward Iraq in 2003 and Pakistan's continued support for the Taliban. The US's involvement in Iraq allowed the fragmented remnants of the Taliban system (1996–2001) to reorganize, and Pakistan fostered them and ensured their control in conflicts with NATO and the Afghan government. After exhausting all military options to smash the Taliban, NATO decided to support the Afghan government's offer of compromise to the Taliban. Whatever the case, the Taliban continues to remain hostile and obstinate. (Bukhari, 2005). When the Soviets began to leave Afghanistan in 1989, the Afghan nationalist government of the time also tried to negotiate with mujahideen leaders (the "Peshawar Seven") but failed due to Pakistan's role as a spoiler. President Najibullah asked Pakistan to help with this political solution to the 10-year war and recommended creating a public solidarity government with the mujahideen. However, the "Peshawar Seven" continually rejected the idea and demanded the fall of President Najibullah's government in response to a gesture from Pakistan. Pakistan's unwavering support serves as a crucial incentive for the Taliban to maintain hostility and fight for unrestricted power. Without a doubt, Pakistan has the power to pressure the Taliban into making a sincere deal with the Afghan government. In any event, that isn't the final goal Pakistan needs to keep an eye on in Afghanistan; rather, what it appears to need to achieve is a tactical arrangement of this kind, or an organized government structure, where the Taliban should possess the greatest authority and be in the driver's seat. The Taliban appear ambiguous since any political agreement will undoubtedly result in an

Afghan government of moderate patriots. Pakistan also exhibits little interest in supporting a moderate patriot administration in Afghanistan. This is because it fears that such a system will conflict with Pakistani authority and important plans that, if the Taliban are in control, will be safeguarded. Pakistan also believes that the Taliban are the best tool to resolve the Pashtuistan conflict and the Durand Line because they are essentially uninterested in any of these contentious issues. (Zahid, 2007).

Pakistan's friendly agreements with the Afghan Taliban are shaped solely by the desire to support them, despite the fact that Pakistan reportedly has no real understanding of the various hazards they pose. Currently, Pakistan and Afghanistan both marvel at the Taliban. In any event, it would seem that both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are more loyal to their desire to impose a strong Sharia-based administrative system in the larger area than to Pakistani interests opposing Afghanistan. The fact that Islamists frequently disregard the Durand Line and the Pashtuistan Issue in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a direct result of their larger-scale goal to reestablish the Caliphate, which sees no end in sight. Islamist movements, notably the Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani), have as their clear goal the unification of all Muslim nations under the Caliphate, and the establishment of Islamic Emirates is their first step in that direction. In South and North Waziristan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members refer to themselves as the Power of the Islamic Emirate. Meanwhile, ongoing remarks by two top TTP figures about overthrowing the Pakistani government and imposing Shariah make clear how their organization and its kind are attempting to spread to the rest of Pakistan. The Talibanization of Pakistan would increase if Afghanistan fell under their control. The Pakistani Taliban are also aware that they have plenty of sympathizers, even though some elements of Pakistani society are opposed to their goal of establishing an Islamic Emirate. The idea of the Islamic Emirate and the Caliphate is supported by considerable segments of Pakistan's Sunni political groups, strict gatherings, and theological colleges. However, there is still a stunning misunderstanding of the Pakistani Taliban held by the country's foundation and academic community, which feels that Talibanization in Pakistan is inextricably linked to the ongoing battle in Afghanistan. They rationalize it as a potential threat to Pakistan and continue to view their strategy of aiding the Afghan Taliban as a workable game plan. But one thing is certain for Afghans: supporting Islamists and undermining moderate patriots in Afghanistan will have horrible consequences, with Pakistan taking the most appalling impact. If the Afghan Taliban warns that nationalism won't protect Afghan pioneers today and President Hamid Karzai is seen

in public near Ariana Square, where President Najibullah's body was publicly hung in 1996, it wouldn't be shocking if the Pakistani Taliban remained in Minar-e-Pakistan tomorrow, imitating the Afghan Taliban and deciding the fate of Pakistan's patriot leaders. (Princeton, 2012).

Recommendations

Although Afghanistan is Pakistan's neighbour, there has always been hostility between the two countries. The main problem is that the administration can't recognize the Durand line dispute. However, the ethnic group in Afghanistan does not accept the Durand Line as an international border. Nevertheless, Afghanistan uses this border to conduct trade with Pakistan and engage in other activities. . Afghanistan is a state with many different ethnic groups. Civilian peace cannot be implemented in this mountainous land since Pashtuns make up roughly 45% of the population and have violent confrontations with other ethnic groups. In this Muslim state, ethnic declarations and peace processes are possible. They still don't have a Pakistani identity, unfortunately. They inspire admiration in Pakistan that is almost anxious. Pashtuns desire to establish a new state. The Pashtuns of Pakistan can be discussed at length over a meal. Negotiation and bilateral communication can strengthen relationships. As the deadline for resolving the Taliban Durand Line other objectives approaches in this worrying circumstance, Pakistan and Afghanistan must sit down together in admiration. The recent Doha meeting, which took place in Qatar on September 12, 2020, covered the Afghan peace process as well as terms and conditions, negotiations with the Taliban, and other aspects of how the United States can withdraw from Afghanistan. This peace process is continuing in a very positive way, and it can be completed with the help of international actors, particularly Pakistani authorities.

Conclusion

In any event, demonstrating the excessive cost of the Cold War is one thing; demonstrating a clear and direct link between this and the collapse of the Soviet Union is quite another. This might make it simpler to defend the 40-year military control policy. However, it doesn't actually make for compelling history. In reality, in our opinion, the Soviet Union was not only prepared to pay the costs of the Cold War but had largely concealed them despite its numerous mistakes. . The Afghan War, perhaps one of the most intense yet underappreciated military conflicts of the 20th century, is the only event that fits this description, one that researchers of the end of the Cold War continue to ignore at their peril. According to the previous analysis, emotional and significant events are the only things that cause domains to implode. Bilateral relations can solve mistrust between two Muslim states, if both authorities work out on terrorism, extremism, drugs trafficking and settlement with Taliban. Currently, Taliban government in Kabul so it's very important to deal with Taliban for peace and prosperity for both neighbors.

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